In parliamentary democracies parties bargain over ministerial seats when a new government is formed. Although allocations of seats to parties are observable, the number of posts each party obtains does not tell us how much the party actually gains, because ministerial seats may be of varying importance. Thus, we need to know the relative weights of ministers to understand how much each party gains in government formation. In this paper we propose a method to estimate relative weights of ministerial posts in a parliamentary democracy.
How important is the post of one minister compared with another? Despite the importance of this question, the literature provides no statistical method for estimating ministerial weights. As Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss, and Ting (2003, p.18 ) put it, " [t] his is a general problem in the study of coalition government." Ministerial weights not only reveal the actual gains of parties in government formations but are indicative of two intrinsic factors in a ministry: policy importance and pork-barrel spending. A ministry whose policy area is important to political parties may carry a high weight.
Likewise a ministerial post which distributes or strongly influences pork-barrel spending may also be highly weighted. Thus, estimated ministerial weights may tell us which ministry are important to parties.
Other questions we try to answer through statistical estimation are 1) how voting weights translate into gains from allocated seats, i.e. the scale effect of party size, and 2) how large the advantage of being a formateur is. Does a bigger party gain more than their voting weights out of the government formation process? Does becoming a formateur provide a party with an extra share in the cabinet formation process? Gamson (1961) presents a hypothesis, often called " Gamson's Law," that the share of cabinet posts for a party is proportional to its relative size in the coalition. This has been one of the central questions in the empirical literature of government formation. One of the innovations in this paper is that we reconsider these questions allowing cabinet posts to have different levels of importance.
The method we present combines a bargaining model of government formation 1 with maximum likelihood estimation. The approach of combining a formal theory and estimation is often called structural estimation. 2 Compared to reduced-form estimation or simple regression, an advantage of this approach is that researchers can estimate and interpret the parameters as model primitives of formal theory. We use variation of the data and the structure of the bargaining model to recover ministerial weights and other parameters. The data required for estimation are who formateurs are, what each party's voting weight is, and what ministerial seats each party obtains, all publicly observable data resulting from politicians' behavior. We emphasize that in applying the proposed method researchers should employ a bargaining game which properly captures institutional and noninstitutional features of government formation.
We then apply the method to the case of Japan. We estimate the model by employing a bargaining game based on the historical stylized facts. Our results statistically show that political players value pork-related posts (such as the Minister of Construction and the Minister of Transport) more highly than prestigious ones (such as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice). Our results also suggest that the scale effect is approximately zero, while formateur advantage is significant. This 1 The existing literature has two distinctive approaches toward government formation. The first approach considers that the surplus from government formation depends on the cabinet post allocation and coalition (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks (1988 Banks ( , 1990 and Shepsle (1990, 1998) . On the other hand, the second approach assumes the surplus from government formation to be unchanged by cabinet post allocation and parties in the coalition (e.g., Baron (1991 Baron ( , 1993 Baron ( , 1998 , Baron and Ferejohn (1989) ). Following the second strand of the literature, the method in the present paper assumes the surplus does not change.
2 See Keane and Wolpin (1997) for recent progress in structural estimation in applied microeconomics.
implies that how much each party obtains in a government formation is almost proportional to its size for non-formateur parties even in an ex post sense (that is, after a first proposer is decided), while formateur party gains more than their voting weights. This confirms Gamson's (1961) earlier predictions, which have been studied empirically with a strong assumption that all cabinet posts have the same weights such as Browne and Franklin (1973) and Browne and Frendreis (1980) . 3 Warwick and Druckman (2001) employ the ranking of importance of ministers reported by Laver and Hunt (1992) 4 to reconsider the empirical relationship between cabinet post allocation and seat shares.
Recently, Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss and Ting (2003) offer a more comprehensive empirical analysis; they investigate the above relationship under two alternate assumptions (i.e. the assumption that all cabinet posts are equally valuable, and the one that the relative value of the Prime Minister is three times higher than those of other ministers). Although their data is taken from European countries, their result on the scale effect and formateur advantage is similar to ours with the Japanese data. Parties' gains are proportional to voting weights for non-formateur parties, and there is significant formateur advantage. Note that both Warwick and Druckman (2001) and Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss and Ting (2003) still make an a priori assumption on ministerial weights by assigning exogenously determined numbers to ministerial weights.
3 For overviews of the empirical literature, see Browne and Dreijmanis (1982) , Schofield (1990), Laver and Shepsle (1996) , Strom (1990) and Warwick (1994) . 4 Laver and Hunt (1992) measure the ministerial values by surveying major politicians in European democracies.
Similarly, Kato and Laver (1998) survey Japanese political scientists about the ministerial ranking (excluding the Prime Minister), where the Minister of Finance is judged the most important, followed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Our result reported in this paper does not necessarily contradict Kato and Laver's (1998) result. This is because they estimate the "importance" subjectively evaluated by scholars, who are not players in politics, while we estimate the values of cabinet posts by using only the publicly observable behavioral data.
Our contributions to the empirics of government formation are threefold. First, we present a new approach of finding the weights of ministers from the data of cabinet post allocations. The second contribution is that we study the scale effect of the voting weights and formateur advantage on the gain from government formation. Finally, we have constructed the data set on seat shares and cabinet posts of the Japanese government, while all existing studies uses data of Western European countries.
This paper is also related to political economics literature on structural estimation of theoretical models of politics, where there is relatively a small number of papers. 5 Merlo (1997) uses a stochastic multilateral bargaining model to study the duration of government formation and government stability, and the effect of deadline date for such variables. Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003) extend Merlo's (1997) approach, and identify the effects of constitutional features on the stability of governments using data from nine European countries. Our contribution to this literature is that we deal with the allocation issue in the bargaining model, while Merlo (1997) and Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo (2003) have focused on other aspects: when and how coalition is formed.
In the next section, we present a general exposition of our estimation method. We then apply the method to the case of Japan and discuss the results. This paper ends with concluding remarks.
Estimation Using a Bargaining Model: A General Exposition

Bargaining Model
We consider government formation as a bargaining game (θ), where θ is a vector of parameters of the game such as the time discount factor and voting weights of parties. The set of political parties is denoted by I = {1, ..., N }, and they are players of the game (θ). Players bargain over the surplus 5 For analyses of elections see Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) and Coate and Conlin (2002) .
from government formation which is normalized to one. 6 An allocation to players is denoted by
Players' preferences are expressed by the utility function u i (y) = y i , i.e. we assume transferrable utility. These features of the bargaining game (θ) are common to standard bargaining models of government formation such as Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2003) and Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss and Ting (2003) . Let the set of parties in the government be denoted by I g = {1, ..., n}and the remaining parties, which are out of the government, by
.
Condition
The equilibrium allocation y * (θ) of the bargaining game (θ) is unique.
The method we present here does not depend on the equilibrium concept applied to the game (θ). Condition 1 requires that the equilibrium concept generates an unique equilibrium allocation.
Note that uniqueness of equilibrium allocation does not necessarily mean uniqueness of equilibrium. For example, although the sequential bargaining game by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) can have a continuum of equilibria in the class of stationary (that is, time and history independent) strategies, the equilibrium allocation is unique as shown by Eraslan (2002) .
One of the parameters in θ whose effect is of particular interest in the literature is the voting weights of parties. 7 For notational convenience we will use the relative voting weights of the parties in the government 8 and denote them by ω = [ω 1 , ..., ω n ], where n i=1 ω i = 1 holds. We will mea-6 If the size of the surplus changes across time, we normalize it in such a way that the surplus at the time of allocation is equal to one. That is, we normalize the surplus so that n i=1 y i (θ) = 1 holds. 7 See e.g. Gamson (1961) , Browne and Frendreis (1980) and Ansolabehere, Snyder, Strauss, and Ting (2003) . 8 We can use the voting weights in the legislature. The reason for using the relative weights among government parties is for notational simplicity. Our results will not be affected by this. sure the effect of voting weights by parameter α of the function h(ω; a) and denote the parameters in θ other than ω and α by θ . Now,
represent the effect of voting weights. Note that we need ω as data.
Another issue of interest in the literature is the formateur advantage. In many models of government formation, a formateur is selected randomly if no party holds a majority of seats in the legislature. We can also incorporate this factor into our specification by making y * i (θ , h(ω; α)) dependent on the realization of uncertainty. Denote the realization of being a formateur by γ i = 1 and of not being one by γ i = 0. We measure the effect of being a formateur by parameter γ of the function g(γ ; δ) We can then denote the ex post payoff by
where g(γ ; δ) expresses the effect of being a formateur. We require the data of γ as well, i.e. the information on who the formateur is.
Specification and Estimation
Allocations we observe in the data are those of ministerial seats. As we will use only the data of parties in government, we focus on players I g = {1, ..., n}. Let K ≡ {1, ..., k} denote the set of ministerial posts, and let with the normalization in (θ), we normalize the sum of the weights to be one, i.e.
Now, x i β represents the value of ministerial posts party i obtains. This value, however, can only take discrete values given β, while y * i (θ , h(ω; α) , g (γ ; δ)) should possibly take any value in [0, 1] . This is because the surplus over which players bargain should be considered as the "pie," i.e. we want to allow any division of the surplus. To do so, we assume that players can make and receive monetary side-payments to offset the difference between x i β and y * i (θ , h(ω; α), g(γ ; gd) ). In other words, the role of side-payments is for the parties to "settle" the difference in payoff between the (discrete)
value of allocated posts and the payoff they ought to receive. We denote the net amount of sidepayments received by party i as ε i . Then, we have y
. This is because the gain in the bargaining game must be equal to the gain from ministerial posts and side payments for any party. Side-payment ε i is not observable and is determined exogenously by β and (θ). As it seems there is no factor that systematically affects ε i across parties and side-payments are not observable, we treat ε i as a random variable drawn from an identical distribution. 9
Side-payments across parties, however, are not independently distributed. This is because they add up to a constant value, giving {ε i } n i=1 a correlation of negative one. In order to avoid technical difficulties, we assume that the side payments will add up to 0, i.e. there is no outside fund. Then, side-payments have to satisfy the budget balance
Hence, we have only n − 1 degrees of freedom for n draws of ε i . A party receives some sidepayment which has a perfect negative correlation with the net side-payment of all the other parties in the government, while ε i s are independent among those parties.
We observe a similar feature in our data. The number of seats is fixed in each government formation, and each post is assigned to only one party. This implies that the information on the allocation of posts contained in the data for n − 1 parties is equal to the information contained in that of n parties, i.e. the data {x l } n l=1 has the following property:
One might argue that in government formaion political parties give and recieve side-payments strategically. We believe, however, that the allocation of ministerial seats is of more importance than side-payments in government formation and that "[g]overnment ministries are the most tangible manifestations of policy payoffs to governing parties" (Browne and Franklin (1973, p.454) ).
[
. In other words, information on the post allocation of one party is always redundant.
Similarly, the sum of the voting weights is fixed at 1, i.e.,
We can find the voting weights of one party if we know the size of all the other parties. Thus, we can also ignore the information on the voting weights of one government party because it is redundant.
Following this reasoning, we ignore the data for one party and use only n − 1 equations for each government formation. This enables us to ignore the correlation among ε i s. If we use only n − 1 parties for estimation, ε i s are no longer correlated since they have n − 1 degree of freedom. We denote the party to be ignored by l. Now, we have the following n − 1 equations for a government formation:
Finally, we will estimate the model using the maximum likelihood method. As we have argued above, we have no reason to assume that the distributions of ε i s are dependent nor non-identical.
Furthermore, we have no reason to assume that side-payments are systematically correlated among parties or across time. 10 Also, ε i s cannot take any value out of [−1, 1]. Hence, we assume that ε i follows an i.i.d. Generalized Beta distribution with mean 0 and estimate the model using the maximum likelihood method. 11
We number the name of the government with superscript t ∈ {1, ..., T }, where T is the total number of governments in the data. The data in government formation t consists of how ministerial 10 Remember that the correlation arising from the budget balance is eliminated, as descrived above.
11 A Beta distributioin is employed because ε has a finite support. In fact, as the support is now [−1, 1], the Beta distribution we employ is the one called the Generalized Beta of the first kind. For details see McDonald (1984 
As we have (x 1 , ..., x T ) and (ω 1 , ..., ω T ) as observable data, we can obtain a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate by maximizing the log-likelihood function respect to α, β, δ, and θ , given the data. Standard errors can be obtained by the bootstrap method 12 as we demonstrate in the following application. In the rest of the paper, we provide an application of this methodology.
Application: Japanese Governments, 1958 Governments, -1993 In this section we apply the method explained above to government formation in Japan during the period from 1958 to 1993. We have chosen to shed light on government formation in Japanese democracies, a topic which has not been statistically investigated in the literature. Note, however, that our method can be applied to other democracies as well, providing extensive possibilities for future research. First, we consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model of government formation based on the observations of the stylized facts explained in the Appendix 1. Then, we explain the data we use, and finally estimate the model.
We model the game of government formation as a bargaining model among the factions of the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter, the LDP) since the government formation was a process among 12 The bootstrap is a method for estimating the distribution of an estimator by resampling the data, and treat them as if they were the population. For a more explanatory account, see e.g. Horowitz (2001) .
the LDP factions. 13 We employ the unanimity rule for agreement following the observations that the LDP maintained majority, that an LDP faction with a significant size obtained cabinet posts, that no faction have ever left the LDP, and that no vote of no-confidence was vote for by any LDP factions.
We consider this game to be an alternating offer random proposer model. This is because factions could have rejected the offer and voted for a no-confidence resolution to choose the proposer again and restart the process. 14 The model is an extension of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . We generalize the recognition probability as a function of voting weights of the factions, and employ unanimity as the agreement rule instead of majority. For all these model assumptions, we argue the corresponding stylized facts in Appendix 1.
We assume that factions evaluate posts in an identical way. As we argue in Appendix 1, factions are understood to have little difference in policy interests. There is also no reason to assume that some factions value money differently, since they use it in the elections in a very similar way. Hence, we assume that values of cabinet seats are identical to all the factions.
At this point, it might be worth making explicit that we do not consider possible strategic relations between one government formation and another. This is because players' equilibrium payoffs are uniquely determined in the class of strategies we consider (stationary strategies) as will be explained in the latter part of this section (Preposition 2). There is no analytical gain to consider a "repeated game" of government formation because players' equilibrium payoffs of this extended game are just the discounted sum of equilibrium payoffs at each stage game under stationary strategies. Note that if we do not confine the class of strategies to stationary ones, then, as Proposition 1 below shows, any reasonable allocation can be an equilibrium even in each stage game of bargaining (and even under subgame perfection), meaning we cannot connect the model prediction to the data (or we have to connect the infinite possibilities of the real world to one observation, which is impossible).
The Bargaining Model
This game is a multilateral sequential infinite-horizon bargaining game with random proposers and with an unanimity rule. Throughout, we consider a complete information environment. Let the set of players be defined by N = {1, ..., n} where n ≥ 2. We see a faction as a player. Faction i ∈ N has a relative voting weights(or proportion of seats) ω i ∈ [0, 1] where
bargain over the seats of ministers, whose sum of weights are normalized to one.
The game proceeds as follows. In the first period, a faction i is randomly recognized as a
proposer with the probability of
The proposer offers an allocation of cabinet seats and side payments, which we represent in terms of payoff vector y = (y 1 , ..., y n ). After observing the offer, factions sequentially respond whether to accept or reject the offer. We assume that the unanimity agreement is necessary for government formation; if all the factions have accepted the offer, the offer is implemented as proposed, and a government is formed. If not, the game goes to the second stage, and faction i (which can coincide with the same i in the previous period) is randomly recognized with the probability of
. This formulation enables us to test the scale effect of factions. If an estimated α is large, a larger faction is increasingly more probable to be recognized as a proposer. If α is equal to zero, it implies that h i (ω) = ω i , i.e. the probability is exactly proportional to the faction's voting weight.
The following procedure is exactly the same as in the first period, and the game continues until all the factions accept an offer of allocation v. We assume that factions discount the future with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). If an allocation y is agreed in stage τ , faction i will obtain δ τ −1 y i . Otherwise, all factions will have a payoff of 0.
A history is a specification of a finite sequence of the actions taken at each date in the sequence up to the point. A strategy for faction i is a sequence of actions which specifies what to do at every history where it must act, and a strategy profile is an n-tuple of strategies, one for each faction. A strategy profile is subgame perfect if and only if no faction can make itself strictly better off by deviating from its strategy at any single date.
Characterization of Equilibria
The model has multiple subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). In a similar class of multilateral bargaining models (see Sutton (1986) and Baron and Ferejohn (1989) ), any individually rational payoff is shown to constitute an SPE outcome for δ close enough to one. Appendix 2 shows that this result applies to our model with the unanimity rule as well.
Facing this multiplicity of equilibrium and equilibrium payoff, the literature turned its focus on stationary SPE (SSPE), that is, SPE in the class of stationary strategies. A strategy profile is called stationary if it does not depend on the current date and past history. Eraslan (2002) recently showed that we can find a unique equilibrium payoff (there can be multiple SSPE though) by focusing on stationary strategies in a more general model with a q-quota majority agreement. The model here requires unanimity for agreement. In the following proposition, we obtain the closed form solution for the unique equilibrium payoffs of the model.
Proposition (Eraslan (2002)) In SSPE, factions agree in the first period. The SSPE payoff is unique. The ex ante (before a proposer is chosen) payoff for a faction i is E(y
, where E denotes an expectation operator. The ex post payoff for the proposer i and non-proposer j are respectively
Proof.
Replace q-majority in Eraslan's (2002) proofs by unanimity and make discount factors equal for all players.
This characterization has a natural and intuitive meaning; a faction which is chosen as a proposer in the first period is making an offer so that any other faction does not make itself better off by rejecting that offer and going to the next stage. As a result, all the factions agree with that offer in the first period. To put it in another way, the proposer in the first stage can make as favorable an offer to it as possible, keeping other factions from being better off by rejecting the offer.
We use this equilibrium characterization for the estimation of the model in the next section.
The implication of this characterization is as follows. The positive (negative) value of α implies increasing (decreasing) returns to the scale of the size of a faction, while α = 0 implies constant returns to scale. The value of δ is low if formateur have an advantage in obtaining seats, while δ close to 1 implies little formateur advantage. Before turning to the empirical part of the paper, we make further arguments for employing this model.
Discussion of the Model
The SSPE of the model gives us further justification of employing this model. The first feature is about the timing of the agreement. The model predicts that the agreement is immediate. As discussed in Appendix 1, the Japanese government formation period was very short (at the longest, it took only three days after the Prime Minister-designate was selected in the Diet). Compared with other democracies, the bargaining period is exceptionally short. We can call this "immediate" when considering the time that is necessary for the Prime Minister-designate to make an offer. Hence, we can say that the model prediction exactly matches the historical observation that the cabinet formation had been immediate.
Another feature of the SSPE is that all the players have a positive payoff. This results from the assumption of unanimity. For example, if we employ majority rule for agreement, there should be a significant number of factions which cannot obtain a cabinet post. This equilibrium characterization made us to choose unanimity as a decision rule because the stylized facts presented in Appendix 1
shows that any faction of significant non-negligible voting weights obtained cabinet seats in most of the government.
Data
We use Japanese data for the period from 1958 to 1993. 15 We collected the data on the numbers of LDP seats in the lower house, the sizes of factions at the time of cabinet formation, and the 15 The LDP was formed in 1955, and maintained majority until 1993 in the House of Representatives (see Section 3). The factions, however, were not clearly defined at the beginning of the LDP history. We are not able to collect reliable data of how large each faction was and of which faction each member was affiliated with during the period of 1955-1957. (See also Sato and Matsuzaki (1986) .) Kohno (1992, p.371 ) also reports; "During the LDP presidential election in 1957, these leaders began to form alliances ..., and by the end of 1957 eight factions had emerged as distinct organizational features of the LDP."
allocations of cabinet seats to factions, including the identity of the prime minister's faction. We collected this information from Sato and Matsuzaki (1986) and Kitaoka (1995) . 16 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data.
[ Table 1 about here]
Forty four cabinets were formed during this period, and the LDP maintained a majority in the lower house throughout the period. Factions in the LDP changed across time, and the number of factions ranged between 5 to 12 with the average of 8.4 factions. 17 As we use data for each faction in each government, the total number of equations are 415, though the number of observations is 44. Figure 1 , we find that they look different. The bigger the size of a faction, the more likely it will be chosen as a proposer. This assures our model setup which assumes that the probability to be recognized as a proposer is a function of the faction size.
[ Figures 1 and 2 about here] Figure 3 depicts the relationship between the proportion of cabinet posts (i.e. the number of cabinet posts one faction obtained out of all the cabinet posts) and the faction size. There seems to be 16 We also referred to Asahi Shimbun (various issues), which is one of the leading daily newspapers in Japan, when information in Sato and Matsuzaki (1986) and Kitaoka (1995) were not consistent or were lacking. 17 For the estimation, we treated legislators who did not belong to any faction as an independent faction. The average number of seats which independent legislators obatained in each government is 0.75. We define their size by 1/(number of LDP seats).
a positive correlation as a whole. 18 This, however, looks different if we look into it more carefully.
The relationship is not clear for the faction with Prime Minister posts 19 . This also confirms our assumption that cabinet posts have different importance.
[ Figure 3 about here]
No significant bureaucratic reform was implemented during the data period. 20 Numbers of cabinet posts are almost constant. Twenty-one cabinet posts were constant throughout this period.
Minor changes occurred in the early 1970's when three new agencies were created (three posts are added accordingly), and in 1984 when one agency was closed. 21 There was no significant change in the electoral system during the data period.
18 Browne and Frendreis (1980) 
Specification of the Model
The multilateral bargaining model presented above specifies the unique SSPE payoff for each faction (see Proposition 2). As we have already presented the model, we now follow the general exposition we have presented earlier. Preposition 2 provides the expression for y * i (θ , h(ω; α) , g(γ ; δ)),
for proposer's faction i, and
for non-proposer j ∈ N \{i}. Therefore, each government formation provides us with a system of n equations as above. As discussed previously, we ignore the data for one faction, and use only n − 1 equations for each government formation for consistency. This enables us to ignore the correlation among ε i s. For convenience, we choose the faction of the proposer to be removed from our estimation. 22 Thus, we have the following n − 1 equations for a government formation:
for any non-proposer factions j ∈ N \{i}.
On this system of n − 1 equations for each government, we have a trivial solution of δ = 0, β 1 = 1 and β k = 0 for k ∈ K \{1} if we ignore ε. When we estimate using the above specification, estimations always give values very close to δ = 0, β 1 = 1 and β k = 0. 23 This, however, cannot be 22 Our results do not depend on the choice of faction we do not use. This is because the data for n − 1 faction have exactly the same amount of information as that of n factions for the reasons discussed earlier. 23 This is a trivial answer to the system of equations if we ignore ε. The answer is true for any values of ω and X.
a solution as weights of ministers other than prime minister is 0. We will avoid this trivial solution by dividing both sides of the equation by δ to prevent δ from being 0, i.e.,
Finally, we will estimate the model using the maximum likelihood method. The likelihood function can be written as 24
In the actual calculation, we have employed the bootstrapping method. We randomly drew observations from the original data without replacing the original data for the same number of times as the original number of observations. We repeated this process 500 times, and used the average as the point estimates and the standard deviations as the standard errors for the parameters.
Results
Estimates
The result is presented as Table 2 below. The reported standard error is obtained using the bootstrap method.
[ Table 2 about here] 24 Now, the Generalized Beta distribution of the first kind has support [−1/δ, 1/δ] and mean 0.
The last column in Table 2 reports the result with an restriction that α = 0. The result is almost the same as the one without this restriction. The likelihood decreases only by 0.22. The likelihood ratio test cannot reject a hypothesis α = 0 even at 1% level. This is also clear from the robust standard error of α reported in Table 2 . Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no scale effect of the voting weights.
Discussion
The above results tell us a number of important things. First, we find that the post of the Prime
Minister has by far the highest value. This should not be a peculiar result. The power of the Prime
Minister results from many factors: 1) Constitutionally, he is the head of the cabinet, and all of the cabinet decisions need his signature.
2) The budget has to be signed by the Prime Minister before it is submitted to the legislature. 3) He can also control the legislative process by having the power to dissolve the legislature. In addition to these and many other factors, this high weight on the Prime Minister may also reflect the power to propose a ministerial seat allocation. Although we do not know how much each of these factors contributes, we are not surprised that the Prime Minister has the highest value.
The second observation is that the Ministers of Construction and Transport have the next highest values to the Prime Minister. These are alleged to be "dirty" posts. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) mention the Ministry of Construction as having been characterized as "a politically driven pork wagon" (p.124). There are many other academic as well as journalistic accounts for the claim that these two posts have strong influence on pork-barrel projects (see e.g. Woodall (1996) ). The
Ministry of Construction is in charge of the construction of dams, bridges and roads. The Ministry of Transport controls the procurement process of ports, airports, railways, and highways.
A third point, which is most clearly seen in the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, is that ministerial weights are not necessarily correlated with the seniority of the appointed politicians. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs are reported to be important (see e.g. Kato and Laver (1998) ), and posts for a senior politician (see e.g. Sato and Matsuzaki (1986) ). The value to the factions, however, is very low in our result. Our model focuses on the bargaining among factions and the values of ministers from the perspective of factions. The factions have politicians of diverse seniority, and our result tells that the seniority is only one of the factors for the allocation of the cabinet posts. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper has structurally estimated relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democracies. This and other interesting issues are left for future research.
Appendix 1: Government Formation in Japan, 1958 Japan, -1993 In this part, we describe institutional and non-institutional features of government formation in Japan during the period of 1958-1993, which our formal model is based upon. Second, LDP factions have been the primary internal organizational unit of the LDP, and have played a central role in cabinet formation (see, e.g. Leiserson (1968) , Sartori (1976) , Kohno (1992) and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) ). The LDP factions are said to have little difference on their preferences over policy issues. For example, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, p.77) say "Factions, in fact, have virtually no role outside of personnel matters. This is because each faction is more or not related to government formation. 28 During the period of 1958-1993, cabinets were formed within two days after the Prime Minister-designates were selected. One exception is that it took three days when the second Ohira cabinet was formed (November 6 to 9, 1979). 29 The only exception took place in 1979, when the LDP had two candidates. Once designated, Prime Ministerdesignate Ohira allocated seats to all the factions with the significant size, including the ones who voted against him when he was approved in the diet.
less a microcosm of the entire party in terms of policy preference and expertise." 30 We observe that the LDP factions had no significant difference in their preference over policy areas. 31 In the actual process, the Prime Minister offers a proposal of cabinet posts to all the factions.
Factions respond to the offer by agreeing or by requesting more and/or different seats, and then the offer is revised. In case factions cannot agree with the revised offers, the factions could ask for a change of the LDP leadership or leave the LDP, and/or vote for the vote of no-confidence.
Historically, none of these disagreements happened. The President of the LDP has never changed right after the designation of Prime Minister-designate. During the period of 1958 to 1993, no faction left the LDP and no vote of no-confidence was ever agreed upon by any LDP factions. We interpret these facts as follows: the cabinet formation process was under unanimous agreement of all the factions. 32 Another fact is that any faction of significant size obtained cabinet seats in most of the cabinets. This also supports our interpretation that the agreements were unanimous because non-unanimous agreements should (at least theoretically) always result in no cabinet seats for some factions.
Historically, no cabinet formation required more than three days. We interpret this as an immediate agreement for two reasons. First, the Prime Minister-designate will need time to form his offer to 30 Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993, p.211) 32 Factions may get frustrated with the cabinet formation. We, however, think that they still agreed upon even though they may have got frustrated. For example, Fukuda faction thought they were underrepresented in the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet in 1972, while they never really tried to form a hostile coalition nor called for a no-confidence resolution, even though they could have succeeded in it to restart the cabinet formation process. (Fukuda faction had 56 seats, and the opposition had 207 seat. Hence, vote for a no-confidence resolution could have won by 263-228.) the factions carefully. Even still, the offer is agreed and the cabinet is formed within a short period of time. Second, the comparison with another country tells us that the agreement is immediate. Merlo With this profile, any deviation from this profile results in the continuation payoff of zero for the deviating player, while no deviation always produces a non-negative payoff to the player. Minister's faction (line with steeper slope) and 2) factions without Prime Minister's Posts.
